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OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is found in Oak Lane 
Homeowners Assoc, v. Griffin, 219 P.3d 64 (Utah App. 2009). A copy of the decision is 
included as Addendum B in the Appendix attached to Oak Lane's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78A-3-102(3)(a) (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was initiated by Oak Lane on November 19, 2003. R.2. On 12/8/04 the 
trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the Griffins. R.441. Oak Lane 
appealed that decision and the summary judgment was overturned by the Court of 
Appeals, on the basis that disputed issues of material fact precluded the award of 
summary judgment on the grounds found by the trial court, and remanded to the trial 
court. R.473. 
On remand, the Griffins' filed for summary judgment on a different basis than that 
previously granted by the court. R.660. That motion was granted by the Trial Court in its 
order of 12/21/07. Oak Lane appealed this order. On September 11, 2009 the Court of 
Appeals filed its opinion affirming the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment to the 
Griffins. On or about October 9, 2009 Oak Lane filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
with this Court, which petition was granted. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The Alpine City Council approved and accepted the Oak Hills Haven plat, which 
contained five lots, on January 13, 1977. A copy of the plat is attached to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R.665. 
2. The plat clearly identifies Oak Lane as a "Private Lane". R.665. 
3. The Oak Hills Haven Subdivision consists of five lots. R.665. 
4. Defendants, Dennis and ReNae Griffin own Lot 2 of the Oak Hills Haven 
Subdivision. Affidavit of ReNae Griffin. ReNae Griffin's affidavit was submitted 
with her prior Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R.662. 
5. The Griffins purchased the property in 1988. R.662. 
6. For almost sixteen years, and until October of 2003, the Griffins accessed their 
home on Lot 2 on a nearly daily basis by using Oak Lane, the cul de sac in the Oak 
Hills Haven Subdivision.R.662. 
7. In 2003 all of the other lot owners in the Subdivision formed the Oak Lane 
Homeowners Association. A copy of the recorded Declaration of Covenants and 
Restrictions is located at R.661. 
8. On or about July 22, 2003, the Association obtained a quit claim deed from the 
original owners of the lots in the subdivision to the property comprising the road. 
R.651. 
9. Based solely on this quit claim deed, the Plaintiff claims ownership of the road. 
R.18. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was only one issue in Oak Lane's Petition. That issue was whether the 
reservation of a street on a subdivision plat map creates an easement in favor of the 
owners' of property in the subdivision over those roads. At the trial court level and on 
appeal Oak Lane argued that recognition of the easement creates a new type of easement, 
not previously recognized in Utah. This is not true. 
The law in Utah and other jurisdictions is absolutely clear that property owners 
adjoining a street in a recorded subdivision plat have an easement to use those roads. Oak 
Lane has failed to cite to a single authority in support of its claim that this is not the law. 
Plaintiff instead tries to argue, without authority, that Utah only recognizes four types of 
easements and this type of easement is not one of the four. This argument is wrong on 
both counts. The easement at issue would fall squarely within the definition of express 
easement, and even if that is not so Utah Courts have recognized the applicability of this 
type of easement for almost 100 years. 1 
In its brief, Petitioner raises a new argument for the first time. This argument is 
that the failure to dedicate Oak Lane as a public street, at the time the Plat was accepted 
by Alpine City, constituted an abandonment of the road necessitating the evaluation of 
additional factors involving convenience and usage. There is no support for Oak Lane's 
position. Oak Lane argues the Court of Appeals decision was made without consideration 
of three Utah cases, Mason v. State of Utah, 656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), Carrier v. 
1 In its decision, the Court of Appeals did not determine whether the easement was express or implied, finding this 
easement has characteristics of both, holding that question was not relevant. Oak Lane v. Griffin at 6-7, see alsofn. 4. 
3 
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) and Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97 
P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004). In its initial brief, Oak Lane did not cite to a single one of 
these cases. The Griffins cited to the Carrier decision in their brief and it was 
subsequently addressed by Oak Lane in its Reply Brief. The Court of Appeals decision 
cites to the Carrier decision at pages 67and 68 and to the Evans case at page 70. The 
allegation that the cases were not considered is therefore false. Furthermore nothing in 
these cases in any way contradicts the holding of the Court of Appeals in this case. 
Finally, Oak Lane challenges the non Utah authority supporting the Court of 
Appeals decision on the basis that it is not binding. This is readily apparent. The treatises 
and other authority were not cited or accepted as binding authority, rather they were used 
in harmony with Utah case law to show the position taken by the Court of Appeals is in 
harmony with the majority view. 
Oak Lane has failed to cite to a single authority or decision that is contrary to the 
holding of the Court of Appeals. Its unhappiness with the holding of the numerous 
authorities that are contrary to its position is not a basis for overturning the decision of 
either the trial court or the court of appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CREATION OF THE SUBDIVISION GIVES THE GRIFFIN'S AN 
EASEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Utah Law Supports The Existence Of The Easement. 
The determination of whether an easement exists is a question of law. Carrier v. 
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Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Utah 2001). Utah Law recognizes that when a subdivision 
is created, an easement is created over private streets, contained in the subdivision for 
those property owners who abut those streets. 
In the Treatise THOMAS AND BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTYLAW'it 
states: 
When an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map (or plat or plan), a 
purchaser of a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over private streets 
as laid out on the map even if the easement is not expressly created in the 
documents of conveyance. 
THOMAS AND BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTY LA W, §12.02(b) (2) (iii) pg. 
529. 
Likewise in the Treatise UTAH REAL ESTATE LA Wfor Brokers and Salespersons 
it states: 
Other Implied Easements. These arise when subdividers lay out streets and lots 
on a plat map or plan of the tract. When the lots bounded by streets are sold, an 
easement in favor of the lot purchaser, for access over the street, arises by 
implication. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE LAW for Brokers and Salespersons, Corny, Edward J., §21.6.0 
Creation of Easements by Implication. 
Utah case law has long recognized the creation of an easement, for use of roads, in 
favor of property owners upon recordation of a subdivision plat map. In Carrier v. 
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Utah 2001) the Utah Supreme Court stated " Under Utah 
law, landowners whose property abuts public streets, alleys, and public ways that appear 
on a plat map are entitled to a private easement over those public ways." Carrier at 1116. 
5 
The Carrier court cited with approval to the 1912 Utah Supreme Court decision in Tuttle 
v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959 (1912) wherein the court held: 
No doubt the law is to the effect that purchasers buying lots with reference to a map 
or plat which is authorized by the owner of the ground, and such map or plat to be a 
street or alley, then, and in such event, the purchasers acquire a right to have such 
street or alley maintained as such, and the owner of the ground is estopped from 
vacating or obstructing the same. 
Tuttle at 962. 
The Carrier court also cited with approval to the Supreme Court decision in 
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952). In Boskovich the 
court held: "If the dedicated streets of a subdivision are laid out and the right to the use 
thereof has arisen, a private easement arises therein which constitutes a vested proprietary 
interest in the lot owners ...." Boskovich at 431. The court also cited with approval to the 
Thomas real property treatise cited above. Carrier at 1116. 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals in Evans v. Board of County Comm V, 97 P.3d 
697 (UT App 2004) aff d 123 P.3d 432 (Utah 2005) recognized Utah's "longstanding 
doctrine that a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase of property 
with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads have not been legally vacated prior to 
the purchase." 
Contrary to the Plaintiffs unsupported assertion, the law in Utah clearly does 
recognize an easement upon recordation of a subdivision plat, and has done so for over 
100 years. 
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B. Other Authorities Likewise Recognize The Existence Of An Easement Upon 
Recordation. 
Utah law follows the general rule across the country. In 25 Am Jur. 2d Easements 
andLicenses§26 (1966) it states: 
Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to a 
plat or map on which streets, alleys, parks and other open areas are shown, an 
easement therein is created in favor of the grantee. Such an easement is deemed a 
part of the property to which the grantee is entitled and of which he cannot be 
divested except by due process of law. It exists entirely independent of the fact of 
dedication to public use. 
A search of other jurisdictions shows universal support for the position taken in 
Am Jur. For example in Carolina Land Company, Inc. v. Bland, 217 S.E.2d 16 (S.C. 
1975) The Court stated: 
We have held that where a deed describes land as is shown on a certain plat, such 
becomes a part of the deed. It is generally held that when the owner of land 
conveys lots with reference to the pint, he thereby dedicates said streets to the use 
of such lot owners, their successors in title and the public. Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. 
Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 145 SE. (2d) 922. We also held in the cited case that the 
purchaser of lots with reference to the plat of the subdivision acquired every 
easement, privilege, and advantage shown upon said plat, including the right to the 
use of all the streets, near or remote, as laid down on that plat by which the lots 
were purchased. We also held as between the owner, who has conveyed lots 
according to a plat and his grantee or grantees, the dedication is complete when the 
conveyance is made, even though the street is not accepted by the public 
authorities. 
Carolina Land Company at 18. 
Likewise in Johnson v. Skyline Telephone Membership Corp., 365 S.E.2d 164 
(N.C. App. 1988) the court stated: 
It is well established that an owner who subdivides his property and records a plat 
showing the existence of street and roads within the subdivision impliedly grants to 
purchasers of lots in the subdivision the right to use these streets and roads. 
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Johnson at 165. 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated the rule as follows: 
It is familiar law that where lots are sold by reference to a recorded plat or plan 
showing existing or proposed streets which constitute boundaries of the lots, a 
conveyance ordinarily operates to convey to the grantee the fee simple to land 
underlying adjoining streets and rights of way to the center line thereof, together 
with easements to use such rights of way as well as others which do not bound the 
lot conveyed. 
Gagnon v. Moreau, 225 A.2d 924 (N.H. 1967) 
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Nelson v. Roscommon Co Rd Comm, 117 Mich 
App 125; 323 NW2d 621(1982) stated: 
A grantee of property in a platted subdivision acquires a private right entitling him 
to use of the streets and ways laid down on the plat, regardless of whether there 
was a sufficient dedication and acceptance to create public rights. 
Cited in Beckwith v. Deeg, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1172. 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals gave a more detailed explanation for the theory on 
which the rights are created. There the court stated: 
We believe that law is well established that when land is sold by reference to a plat 
upon which several street and avenues are laid out, the grantee acquires an 
easement in the street or way upon which his lot is situated, and in such other 
streets or ways as are necessary or convenient to enable him to reach a highway. In 
every road dedication by plat there are two recipients of rights. Those recipients are 
the representative governing body and the abutting landowners who purchased on 
the promise of the plat. The fee does not rest in the governing body. That body has 
the right to accept the dedication as a public trust and maintain the road. If the 
public body rejects that dedication, that fact does not affect the fee and remaining 
rights in the abutting landowner. The fee that is in the abutting landowner is subject 
to the easement rights of others. If there is a public acceptance of the road, the fee 
is burdened with the rights of the general public to use the land as a public road 
until such time as it is closed by public authority. If there is not public acceptance 
there yet remains an easement upon the fee. The easement is a collective private 
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easement. Each landowner who purchase under such a recorded plat is entitled to a 
private road easement over the lands shown as roads on the plat to their termines 
with public roads. Such easement is not one of necessity, but one of convenience 
for which he and each adjoining owner paid. 
Cummings v. Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675,677 (Tenn. App, 1987). 
Finally, in Illinois there are an entire line of cases which uphold this legal principle. 
Many of these cases are cited in Cook v. Mighell Construction Company, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 
43 (111. App. 1976). 
... .the purchasers of lots in the platted subdivision have a right against the plattor 
or his privies, to have the tracts marked on the plat as roadways kept open for their 
use, regardless of whether they have been accepted as highways.... 
No law is better settled in this State than that which controls this case. Where the 
owner of land lays it out in lots and blocks and makes and exhibits a plat thereof 
showing streets and alleys and sells some of the lots with a clear reference to the 
plan, the purchaser acquires as appurtenant to the lots every easement, privilege 
and advantage which the plan represents as belonging to them as a part of the 
platted territory 
It is a settled principle that where the owner of an estate has divided it into 
different parts, as lots and alley or ways, and so arranged them that one part derives 
an advantage from another of a permanent, open and visible character, and has 
afterwards sold a part of the property, the purchaser takes the part sold with all the 
benefits and burdens which appear at the time of the sale to belong to it. It is not 
necessary that the easement claimed by the grantee be absolutely necessary for the 
enjoyment of the estate granted, but it is sufficient that it is highly convenient and 
beneficial thereto. 
Cook at 46-48. 
In reading through Plaintiffs brief it appears its defenses fall into three claims (1) 
Oak Lane is a private lane and not a public street (2) there is no specific reference to the 
Lane in the deed given to the Griffins and (3) the Griffins have other access to public 
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streets. 
As referenced in the treatises and the case law, the fact that the street is a private 
lane and not a public street is irrelevant. The Defendants are not "public" members 
seeking access, they are the owners of property in the subdivision, indeed, they are owners 
of property actually adjoining the street. The easement was created and effective for the 
owners of Lot 2 at the time the subdivision was created, and is still there today. 
The treatises and case law also expressly state that the easement is created at the 
time the subdivision is recorded "even if the easement is not expressly created in the 
documents of conveyance." THOMAS AND BACKMAN ON UTAH REAL PROPERTY 
LAW, § 12.02(b)(2)(iii) pg. 529. 
Whether there was any other access to the property to Defendants' property is also 
completely irrelevant. The easement is not one of necessity, but one of convenience, and 
enjoyment. 
The undisputed facts are that the Griffin's property description is Lot 2 Oak Hills 
Haven. It's legal description is defined by and was created at the time the subdivision plat 
was recorded. The Plat shows the creation of a private lane for the benefit of the 
subdivision. The private lane abuts the Griffin's property. There are no disputes as to 
any of these elements and accordingly, as a matter of law the Griffin's have an easement 
over Oak Lane. 
C. There Is No Need To Identify The Type of Easement Involved. 
Plaintiff cites to Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999) for the proposition 
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that there are only four types of easements recognized in Utah law. The Court in Potter 
examined four different types of easement to determine whether there was an easement in 
that case. Nothing in the decision claims that these are the only types of easement 
recognized at law in Utah. 
Indeed the learned treatises cited above specifically identify the easement created by 
plat as a separate type of easement from the four identified in Potter. For purposes of the 
summary judgment motion at issue here, the Griffins did not claim an easement by 
necessity, prescription or implication. Accordingly the Plaintiffs analysis of these 
easements is a waste of time. 
It could be argued that easement by plat does however fit into the category of an 
express easement. An express easement is one that is expressly created between two 
parties in a land transaction by an express grant or reservation. The express easement 
also requires mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intent to be bound by its terms 
and consideration. 
In the instant case the initial property owners of the land in the subdivision created the 
plat which they all acceded to, reserving land for Oak Lane and in return the city granted 
them the right and privilege of subdividing the land into lots. In essence, although it is a 
separate form of easement, the easement created through the recordation of a plat would 
meet all requirements of an express easement as well. 
II. OAK LANE'S CITED CASES DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS. 
Oak Lane's entire premise for this Petition is that Utah Law does not recognize an 
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easement by plat. In its current petition Oak Lane argues that three Utah decisions stand 
for the proposition that there is no easement by plat Mason v. State of Utah, 656 P.2d 465 
(Utah 1982), Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) and Evans v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004). 
In its initial appellate brief, Oak Lane did not cite to any of these cases. In its reply 
brief it cited only to the Carrier case. It is disingenuous and improper for Oak Lane to be 
first raising these authorities after appeal let alone after the initial hearings in this matter. 
However, even if this Court were to consider the three cited cases, they do not support 
Oak Lane's position. 
A. The Mason Case Does Not Support Oak Lane's Position. 
In Mason v. State of Utah, 656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed two issues "(1) When the State acquired the disputed strip by warranty 
deed, did it acquire a fee simple interest or only an easement? And (2) Does the 
abutting landowner (appellant) have a private easement along some part of the 
abandoned highway?." Mason at 468. Neither of these two issues is germane to the 
issue before this Court. 
The tests set forth in Mason specifically are addressed to issues relating to the 
location of public roads. Indeed the first issue was decided on the basis of statutes not 
applicable and in one case repealed long before this case. Mason at 466-467. They 
have nothing to do with platted subdivisions. In trying to twist the Mason decision, 
Oak Lane has specifically ignored the holding of this Court in Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 
12 
P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) limiting the holding to its facts. There this Court stated: 
Defendants nevertheless contend that even if an easement exists over the alley, that 
easement should be limited to access that is "reasonably necessary" under the 
circumstances. Defendants rely on Mason v. State, in which this court held that a 
private easement over a road vacated and destroyed by the State extended only insofar 
as "the alternative access imposed measurable hardship that was unreasonable under 
the circumstances." Id. at 469. Defendants argue that access to the entire 15 foot width 
of the alley is not reasonably necessary because plaintiffs have primary access to the 
front of their homes from Eleventh Avenue and because plaintiffs can still access their 
backyards through the unobstructed 7 1/2-foot portion of the alley. 
Defendants fail to note, however, a critical distinction between this case and Mason, 
which involved a conflict between private and public entities. In order for a 
government to be effective, it needs the power to establish or relocate public 
throughways, even at the expense of some individual citizens, for the convenience and 
safety of the general public. See id. ("The property owner's right to preserve the status 
quo on access to and over abutting highways must be qualified by the public interest in 
relocating public highways for greater advantage at minimum possible cost and in 
facilitating the return of land to productive purposes.") In fact, cities are vested with 
the statutory power to "lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, 
pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,... and may 
vacate the same ... by ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 (1999). 
No public entity is involved in this case. There is no private right of condemnation, nor 
is there a need for one. One citizen has no entitlement to another citizen's property or a 
right to obstruct another citizen's easement. It is a long-held tenet of property law that 
a servient estate cannot" 'unreasonably restrict or interfere with the proper use of.... 
[an] easement' ". Wykoffv. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1982) (quoting N. Union 
Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1976)). 
We believe that applying the reasonable necessity test to disputes over private 
easements would give a servient estate the power to obstruct an easement, and then 
extinguish or limit that easement, by claiming that the easement was not reasonably 
necessary for the easement holder to access his or her property. Such a result would in 
essence acknowledge and permit a private right of condemnation. Private easement 
holders should not be subjected to the burden of defending their existing easements as 
reasonably necessary. 
Carrier at 1117-1118. 
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The Carrier Court's analysis puts to rest the claim of applicability of Mason. This 
case involves no public entity, it simply involves two citizens where one is trying to 
obstruct another. The Carrier decision is absolutely clear that in such an instance there is 
no "reasonable necessity test". 
B. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Interpreted Carrier. 
As set forth above, this Court in Carrier clearly held that the Oak Lane private citizens 
have no right to obstruct the Griffin's easement. The Court of Appeals recognized that 
although this case involves a private lane and the Carrier case involved a public roads 
right to a public easement exists in either case. Oak Lane at 67. 
The key factor in Tuttle v. Sowadski. 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959 (1912), Carrier v. 
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001) and Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97 
P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004) is whether the road at issue had been abandoned as a road 
prior to the time the party claiming the easement had acquired the property. Oak Lane is 
still being used and has been used as a road since the inception of the subdivision.2 
The road has never been "abandoned". The designation of the road as a private lane as 
opposed to a public road is irrelevant for purposes of determining a parties rights to an 
easement over those adjoining streets. Cook v. Mighell Construction Company, Inc. 353 
N.E.2d 43,46 (111. App. 1976) ("the purchasers of lots in the platted subdivision have a 
right against the plattor or his privies, to have the tracts marked on the plat as roadways 
2 "In accordance with our ruling, the trial court's conclusion that the Griffins had an easement to use the road based 
on the deed's reference to the plat is sustainable as a matter of law giventhat Oak Lane was used as a roadway at 
the time the Griffins obtained title to Lot 2 and is still used as a roadway." Griffin at 70 (emphasis added). 
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kept open for their use, regardless of whether they have been accepted as highways...) 
Cummings v. Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675,677 (Tenn. App, 1987) (In every road dedication 
by plat there are two recipients of rights. Those recipients are the representative governing 
body and the abutting landowners who purchased on the promise of the plat. The fee does 
not rest in the governing body. That body has the right to accept the dedication as a public 
trust and maintain the road. If the public body rejects that dedication, that fact does not 
affect the fee and remaining rights in the abutting landowner.) 
The attempt to stretch the delineation of the type of street into an abandonment, 
apart from being a new argument being first raised in this Petition, makes no sense 
factually, grammatically, or legally. 
C. The Court of Appeals Did Not Ignore Evans. 
Oak Lane argues that the case of Evans v. Board ofCty Cornmisioners, 97 P. 3d 697 
(Utah App. 2004) "went unnoticed by the Oak Lane II court...". Oak Lane Petition pg. 13. 
This is simply not true. Reference to the case is found in the Appellate Court decision at 
pg. 70. There the Court noted that the Evans Court recognized "Utah's longstanding 
doctrine that a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase of property 
with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads have not been legally vacated prior to 
the purchase." Oak Lane at 70. 
The telling point is that the Evans decision required the roads at issue to have been 
"legally vacated" prior to the existence of an exception to the public road issue. The 
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undisputed facts of this case are that there was no legal vacation of Oak Lane prior to the 
purchase of the Griffins, and there still has not been one as of this date. 
In short, nothing has changed since the creation of the plat, and this new argument 
notwithstanding, the case law cited by the Petitioner supports the Appellate Court's 
petition that the Griffins have an easement on Oak Lane. 
HI. THERE IS UNANIMITY IN THE POSITIONS OF OTHER AUTHORITIES. 
Oak Lane appears to be under the misperception that the learned treatises cited as 
authority above, and in the Court of Appeals decision, are cited as binding precedent. 
This simply is not true. The authorities are merely additional analysis of the issue 
presented before the court. They represent well considered opinions based on not only 
case authority, but statutory authority, statutory and case law history and comparisons of 
those items in Utah with other jurisdictions. 
The authorities unanimously support the position of the Griffins and the Court of 
Appeals. Oak Lane has failed to cite a single "authority" supporting its position. Instead 
it tries to strain the plain and simple language of the authorities to create an issue of facta 
In challenging Powell on Real Property, Oak Lane fails to even be able to make a strained 
argument on the basis of the language. Instead it falls back on the argument that Powell 
3 An example is foot note 10 of Petitionees Petition where they claim a contradiction between the Am. Jur. Section 
on Deed and that of Easements. The problem with this argument is that there is no conflict. The section on deeds 
cited talks about conveyance of title, which is not even an issue m this case There is no dispute before the Court 
ovei who owns Oak Lane, the issue is one of an easement over the load for the Griffins. Furthermore, a Plat is 
clearly more than a simple map. 
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fails to cite to a Utah case. As shown above all the Utah cases support the authorities 
from other jurisdictions and the Court of Appeals decision in this case. 
It is telling that Oak Lane has failed to show that the Court of Appeals 
interpretation of Tuttle v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959 (1912) is in error, or why 
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952) (This case involves 
a duly platted subdivision containing streets and alleys and is thus distinguishable from 
the authority cited by defendants. We have held, in a case cited even by defendants, that if 
the dedicated streets of a subdivision are laid out and right to the use thereof has arisen, a 
private easement arises therein which constitutes a vested proprietary interest in the lot 
owners, which easement survives extinguishment of any co-existing public easement 
calling for just compensation .) does not apply. The simple truth is that all case law and 
other authorities support the decisions rendered in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law and the law as set forth in all learned treatises and the case law from 
across the country all hold that when a subdivision plat is recorded showing streets and/or 
alleys, a private easement in favor of the owners of property in the subdivision is created. 
Oak Lane's only argument against this overwhelming weight of authority at trial 
and on appeal was that Utah does not recognize this type of easement. As demonstrated 
above this is simply not true. 
Now, in its petition, Oak Lane tries to create a new legal argument that the 
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dedication of Oak Lane as a private lane somehow constitutes an abandonment of the 
street. Oak Lane has not cited to a single place in the record where such "fact" was 
claimed. The Court of Appeals, based on the undisputed facts found the street was not 
abandoned. Therefore even if this new argument could be addressed at this late stage in 
the proceedings, It is simply based on a fact not properly plead and supported as required 
by Rule 56 URCP. Furthermore in Boskovich this Court clearly held that a public 
abandonment did not extinguish private easement rights. 
The Court of Appeals decision is a correct finding in light of long established 
precedent in Utah and across the country. The decision should accordingly be upheld. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2010. 
SHAWN D. TURNER, L.C. 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Respondent 
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